argue that there are important constraints on the natural institution of the causal relation between mind and body that limit the scope of contingency and arbitrariness marking the relation, and that establishes a necessity in the relation. Similarly, my nature teaches me through the sensations of hunger and thirst that I should eat and drink, respectively. 5) However, at times certain things are "exhibited to me by nature as if to be pursued or avoided <tanquam persequenda vel fugienda mihi a natura exhibentur>" when in fact they should not be. Two cases are discussed. The first involves a person afflicted with dropsy, which causes a person to sense thirst when drinking would be detrimental to her health. In this case, our nature seems to go against its design by telling us to drink when doing so would be harmful.
Ⅰ
In the Sixth Meditation, Descartes confronts an apparent problem concerning his nature. My nature is the way that I have been designed by God, and since I am a creature of God, it seems that my nature cannot be flawed in any way. By nature, I am inclined to pursue and avoid what causes in me a sensation of pleasure and a sensation of pain, respectively. 3) Sensations themselves are "properly only given by nature <proprie tantum a natura datae sunt>" to show the mind what is "advantageous and disadvantageous <commodo sint vel incommodo> to the mind-body composite <composito>. 4) Similarly, my nature teaches me through the sensations of hunger and thirst that I should eat and drink, respectively. 5) However, at times certain things are "exhibited to me by nature as if to be pursued or avoided <tanquam persequenda vel fugienda mihi a natura exhibentur>" when in fact they should not be. Two cases are discussed. The first involves a person afflicted with dropsy, which causes a person to sense thirst when drinking would be detrimental to her health. In this case, our nature seems to go against its design by telling us to drink when doing so would be harmful.
The second case involves an amputee experiencing phantom limb pain, which is the phenomenon of feeling pain as if in a body 3) AT VII 82, CSM II 57. I adopt the following convention to refer to Descartes's works: "AT" refers to (Adam and Tannery 1996) , with Roman numerals indicating volume and Arabic numerals indicating pages; "CSM I" and "CSM II" refer to (Cottingham, Stoothoff and Murdoch 1990) and (Cottingham, Stoothoff and Murdoch 1999) , respectively; and "CSMK" refers to (Cottingham, Stoothoff, et al. 1997) . In those cases where I provide my own translation, I cite only AT. 4) AT VII 83. 5) For more on the teachings of nature, see my paper Sensational Union: Descartes's Argument for Mind-Body Union in the Sixth Meditation.
part (e.g. the foot) that is no longer present due to prior amputation. The amputee's sensation of pain-as-if-in-the-foot tells her that her foot is being harmed, which is false and misleading since there is no foot. Both cases appear to show that our sensations can fail to fulfill their design, which conflicts with
God's being a perfect artisan.
The basic thrust to Descartes's response is that the conflict is merely apparent. His solution begins with four observations. 6) First, body and mind are distinct insofar as the former is divisible and the latter is indivisible. Descartes notes that the various faculties of mind, such as the power of sensation and the power of intellection,
are not proper parts of the mind, since it is the same mind that senses and understands. Body, on the other hand, does have proper parts that can be separated and divided due to its essence as an extended thing. Second, the mind is affected immediately only by the common sense, which is located at the center of the brain;
when certain motions occur in it, the mind is always affected in the same way, regardless of what state the rest of the body is in.
Third, a particular motion in the common sense that typically originates in the nerves in location L in the body can be caused by stimulation to any intermediate location in the nerves connecting L to the common sense. Fourth, for any sensation resulting from a particular motion in the brain, no other sensation but that one occurs.
The institution by nature is first mentioned by Descartes in the third observation. Roughly, natural institution is the systematic way that mind and body have been set up by nature to interact. My nature was instituted such that mental state M, and only M, occurs 6) in the mind whenever physical state P occurs in the brain. Injury to the foot causes a certain motion in the nerves, which travels up to the center of the brain, where "nature has laid it down <qui institutus est a natura> that this motion should produce in the mind <mentem afficiat> a sensation of pain, as occurring in the foot <sensu doloris tanquam in pede existentis>". 7)
According to Descartes, God could have constituted <constitui> human nature <natura hominis> in such a way that those same motions "exhibited <exhiberet> to the mind any other thing: to be sure, either the motion itself, in so far as it is in the brain, or in so far as it is in the foot, or in some other intermediate location,
or lastly any other thing whatever." 8) Even though the sensation of pain-as-if-in-the-foot occurs whenever a particular motion P occurs in the brain, God could have set things up so that P caused pain as if it were in any location in the body: foot, brain, hand, etc. It appears that God's choice alone determined that P should always
give rise to pain-as-if-in-the-foot.
Ⅱ
Wilson attributes the Natural Institution theory to Descartes, which interprets the relation between mind and body as nothing more than their causal interaction. by God's choice, so the relation is at most extrinsically necessary since it was established by God, whose choices are necessary. She takes the relation itself to be intrinsically contingent in that nothing 9) (Wilson1996, 185). Emphases added. 10) Note here that Wilson thinks that the tendency is to locate the sensation to a particular part of the body. Wilson as many other scholars have taken Descartes to be using such terms as "pain" and "thirst" as being synonymous with "the sensation of pain" and "The sensation of thirst". I, on the other hand, do not think this is the case. This point, however, will not be discussed in the current paper. 11) See Chapter VI of (Wilson 1996) . 12) (Wilson 1996, 181-185) . 13) (Wilson 1996, 183) .
about each relatum can provide sufficient reason that necessitates a connection with the other relatum.
Wilson's interpretation seems to garner support in the twentysecond paragraph of the Sixth Meditation. 14) Descartes states that although a particular kind of violent motion in the brain "gives a sign <signum dat> to the mind to sense something <aliquid sentiendum>, namely, pain as existing in the foot", the "nature of humans <natura hominis> could have truly been constituted by God in such a way, so that that same motion in the brain exhibited <exhiberet> to the mind any other thing". 15) According to Wilson's reading, it is a contingent matter that we sense pain when a particular type of motion occurs in the brain, and also where that pain is located in our experience of it. The experience could have been "any experience" and located "in any other things whatever". (Wilson 1996, 185) . 24) (Wilson 1996, 183) . See also (Wilson 1996, 184-185). experience is of, the locational information is also part of the sensory experience itself. No separate act of locating the experience is stated as happening. Two, the context suggests that Descartes is not talking about the location of the experience, but the apparent location of what the experience is of. The location of the experience, a mental phenomenon, is always in the mind. However, the experience here is an experience of some bodily occurrence, which is always located in the body.
Our analysis shows that the case for Wilson's interpretation lacks sufficient textual support. However, her conclusion that it is "a purely contingent matter that we feel pains 'as if in the hand' or 'as if in the foot' but not 'as if in the blackboard' or 'as if in the hull of our ship'" might nevertheless be true. 25) In the next section, I offer an account that shows her conclusion to be inaccurate.
Ⅳ
The fact that Descartes's discussion of natural institution takes place within the context of human nature places important constraints on how that causal relation can be instituted. By 'nature' in this context, Descartes means "the totality of things bestowed on me by God". 26) Since I am a being composed of two substances, mind and body, I have a nature qua mind and a nature qua body. Hence, there are things that God has bestowed upon me insofar as I am a mind and insofar as I am a body. 27) According 25) (Wilson 1996, 185) . 26) AT VII 80, CSM II 56. to Descartes, a human being is a true unity, i.e. an ens per se. It is not a mere sum of mind and body, but a true union of these two substances: I am an embodied mind. 28) The nature of this embodied mind just is the nature of a human being, and it is nature in this regard that is of "sole concern" in this context. 29) In the Sixth Meditation, Descartes distinguishes nature as an extrinsic denomination <denominatio extrinseca> from nature in an intrinsic sense. The former is exemplified by a clock and a human body, both of which are extended things and thus determined by the laws of mechanics. 30) A badly constructed clock and a wellmade clock are both equally determined by "all the laws of nature", i.e. laws of mechanics, 31) as is an unhealthy human body and a healthy one. 32) While both have an intrinsic nature as an extended thing, they also have a nature that is extrinsically denominated "from my thought" or based on a "preconceived use". 33) It is on the basis of the latter that we are able to apply to them normative notions like good, bad, healthy, and unhealthy. However, 27) AT VII 82, CSM II 57. 28) In December of 1641, Descartes writes to Regius: "In your theses you say that a human being is an ens per accidens. You could scarcely have said anything more objectionable and provactive" (AT III 460, CSMK 200). In the following month, Descartes writes: "…you should give out that you believes that a human being is a true ens per se, and not an ens per accidens, and that the mind is united in a real and substantial manner to the body…that they are united not by position or disposition, as you assert in your last paper -for this too is open to objection and, in my opinion, the nature of a human being, i.e. a mind-body composite, is "something which is really to be found in the things themselves," 34) and there is "truly something that is to be found in fact in the thing, and therefore [for it] to have something of the truth". 35) Unlike the clock and the human body, the nature of "the mind united with this body…is not a mere label". 36) There is a human essence that is not merely denominated from without, but is intrinsic to the very being of a human. 37) The composition of mind and body that is the human being is a true union that has a distinctive, intrinsic nature. 1968) . 38) In talking about the nature of the union, Descartes states that he is "taking nature to be something more limited than the totality of things bestowed upon me by God" since this this includes "many things that belong to the mind alone" and "body alone". However, he explicitly states that he is "not speaking of these matters", but that his "sole concern here" is with his nature as a "combination of mind and body" AT VII 82, CSM II 57. 39) AT VII 82, CSM II 57. 40) See AT VII 83, CSM II 57 and AT VIIIA 41-42, CSM I 224.
living thing. Although our capacity to have thoughts separates us from other corporeal creatures, Descartes takes us to be embodied minds that share in the basic needs and functions characteristic of all living things. Hence, the well-being of the mind-body composite is, in the very least, continued survival as such. Our intrinsic human nature is to seek and maintain this well-being, and the defining purpose of our sensations is determined within the context of this nature. Given these points, bodily injury should be perceived through the sensation of pain. Sensing injury pleasurably would amount to perceiving it as beneficial, which would have disastrous consequences for the composite being. There is clearly a reason that the sensation of pain rather than of pleasure occurs when our foot is injured. There is also a reason that such a sensation is felt as if in the foot rather than as if in the brain. As Descartes himself states, "there is nothing else which would have been so conducive to the continued well-being of the body." 42) The body's need for hydration results in a motion in the brain that "produces in the mind a sensation of thirst, because the most useful thing for us to know about the whole business is that we need drink in order to stay healthy." 43) Human nature is a unified, organic system that fundamentally aims at survival, and "the best system that could be devised" is the one where that sensation, "of all possible sensations, is most especially and most frequently conducive to the preservation of the healthy man. sensation arises is normatively constrained by the intrinsic nature of a human being that it is supposed to serve. 45) In addition, the ability to have sensations requires the mind to be united with the body, and the very nature of a sensory state is determined by the mind-body composite that it serves and presupposes. 46 As explained earlier, sensations are mental states arising for this 45) As an anonymous reviewer has rightly pointed out, this does not explain the details of the structure of the causal relation. The lack of such an explanation has led philosophers to be skeptical of Descartes's causal dualism. However, this issue is separate from the issue of whether that causal relation is contingent and arbitrary or in some sense necessary. My focus here is on the latter issue. As the reviewer astutely notes, just because the causal relation was instituted by God's decision and could have been instituted differently does not entail that the actual causal relation is not necessary. I completely agree. 
